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Because of the Covid-19 lockdowns, South Africa’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) fell by 51 per cent from the first to the second quarter of 2020. A 
recent World Bank report suggests that an additional 26 to 40 million sub-
Saharan Africans could fall into poverty due to the pandemic. At the same 
time, some African economies are reporting initial signs of economic recov-
ery.
 • Most African governments responded to the pandemic with strict lockdowns, 
resulting in severe economic consequences. The impacts have been diverse 
and differ between countries, the informal and formal sectors, industries, and 
 traded products. 
 • The sharp decline in South Africa coincides with initial signs of recovery in both 
West and East Africa. Informal workers across the continent suffered drastic 
short-term income losses during the lockdowns, as very few were shielded by 
social protection or other policies.
 • Trade has declined dramatically, but there are important differences between 
export products. FDI is likely to drop substantially in 2020, including in sectors 
considered key for an acceleration of Africa’s economic development.
 • Economic support by African governments has been far more moderate than 
elsewhere, although the international community has provided additional 
means to African economies.
Policy Implications
A quick recovery could minimise setbacks to economic progress and poverty 
reduction in Africa. This requires a quick response that differentiates across 
countries, industries, and affected workers. The “new normal” should put more 
weight on the economic costs of pandemic-related restrictions. In the medium 
term, African governments need to increase their economies’ and citizens’ resil-
ience to (economic) shocks.
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Low Infections, Lower Mortality, and Strict Lockdowns:  Covid-19 
in Africa
The spread of the pandemic and its health impacts have – so it seems – been dif-
ferent in Africa than in other world regions. First, Africa has relatively low absolute 
infection rates: in mid-September, less than 5 per cent of global confirmed Covid-19 
cases were in Africa, while approximately 17 per cent of the world population lives 
on the continent. [1] Daily infections peaked in July in most countries, and the num-
ber of confirmed cases in Africa surpassed the one-million mark in August 2020, 
with roughly half of those cases concentrated in South Africa. Second, it seems that 
outside of South Africa, mortality is lower in Africa than elsewhere. This is despite 
the share of positive tests being comparable to other world regions (Mbow et al. 
2020), which means low case numbers cannot be attributed to low testing rates 
alone. 
At this stage, it seems likely that early fears that Covid-19 would claim a  dramatic 
number of lives in Africa and overwhelm its weak health systems were overblown 
(Wills 2020). Yet the paucity of data means that the figures showing a somewhat 
milder trajectory for Covid-19 in Africa need to be interpreted with great care. On 
the one hand, it is conceivable that official figures obscure the severity and extent 
of the pandemic, as deaths may be underreported and testing strategies may differ 
systematically from those in other regions. On the other hand, mortality may really 
be lower – not only because Africa’s population is much younger, but also because 
of a lower incidence of risk factors, such as cardiovascular diseases, obesity, and 
diabetes. 
On average, lockdowns in Africa were strict compared to other world regions. 
They were upheld longer than in Europe, as Figure 1 illustrates. While restrictions 
on business activities were lifted gradually, mostly between May and July, night-
time curfews are still in place in countries such as South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, 
and Uganda. Discussions about reopening schools are still underway in Kenya, but 
 Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire are gradually sending students back to school. In June 
2020, virtually all of Africa’s 54 countries had suspended international flights, 
38 countries had announced the closure of land borders, and 17 countries had 
closed their maritime borders. Since mid-September, commercial international 
flights to  Kenya, Rwanda, Ghana and Nigeria have resumed, but flights to South 
Africa have not.
Figure 1 
Government Response 
Stringency Index in 
Comparison
Sources: Authors’ 
own compilation; Data 
source: Hale et al. 2020.
1 As of  15 September 
2020, the WHO reported 
1,365,870 confirmed 
cases in Africa and 
29,155,581 confirmed 
cases worldwide.
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These swift and aggressive containment measures have come at enormous eco-
nomic cost. While governments around the world have put up considerable funds to 
protect their citizens from income shortfalls and job losses, support in most African 
countries has been limited. We provide an overview of these responses and donor 
support below, before assessing the current knowledge about the economic impacts 
at the time of writing – the last week of September 2020. We first look at the domestic 
impacts and then evaluate the limited evidence that is available on the impacts of 
the pandemic on trade and on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. 
Note that we omit a detailed discussion of the pandemic’s impact on  remittances 
and the subsequent economic impacts. The impacts may be severe, with early World 
Bank projections suggesting that Africa’s received remittances could decline by 
more than 20 per cent (World Bank Group and KNOMAD 2020), hitting remit-
tance-dependent countries, such as Senegal and Zimbabwe, particularly hard. Yet 
there is little evidence about what has really happened to date. Recent IMF figures 
suggest that remittances to some countries, including Kenya, have been surpris-
ingly resilient in recent months (Quayyum and Kpodar 2020).
Limited Domestic Support and an Adequate Aid Response
While the lockdowns in African countries were generally strict, many African gov-
ernments provided much less economic support to their citizens and businesses 
than their counterparts in other world regions. As Figure 2 shows, the additional, 
non-health government spending announced is below 2 per cent of GDP for most 
African countries we have information on, compared to more than 10 per cent of 
GDP in Germany. Although these figures are not strictly comparable, they provide 
an indication that the volume of support has been low in most African economies, 
despite recent progress in establishing social safety nets in sub-Saharan Africa (see 
Bodewig et al. 2020). Most African countries have at least one social protection 
programme in place. Nigeria increased coverage of its transfer programme by one 
million beneficiaries. The Togolese government is currently introducing Novissi, a 
temporary cash transfer programme to cushion the impact of the Covid-19 shock. 
Still, the reach of these systems is often limited, compared, for example, to such 
systems in Latin America (Blofield et al. 2020). A World Bank mapping of social 
protection responses to the pandemic concludes that only 5 per cent of sub-Saharan 
Africa’s population is covered by cash transfer or in-kind schemes, compared to a 
global average of 22 per cent (Gentilini et al. 2020).
Figure 2 
Additional Spending 
and Forgone  Revenue 
Announced in Re-
sponse to Covid-19 
and in Areas Other 
than Health (% of 
GDP), Selected Coun-
tries
Source: Authors’ 
own compilation; Data 
source: IMF, 12 June 
2020.
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Despite the relatively moderate increases in government spending, the restrictions 
have led, quickly, to payment difficulties for African governments due to forgone tax 
revenues. There have been important multilateral and bilateral efforts to increase 
the fiscal space for African governments. The G20 finance ministers agreed in April 
to suspend debt service payments on all official bilateral debt until the end of the 
year for the poorest countries. The initiative could free up between 0.1 per cent and 
3.1 per cent of GDP for the 30 participating African countries (excluding Nigeria, 
Kenya, and Ghana). It requires governments to commit to greater debt transparency 
as well as to using the resources for social, health, or economic spending (World 
Bank 2020d). In addition to the suspension of repayments for bilateral debt, the 
IMF has granted USD 214 million in debt relief. [2] Further, the IMF has provided 
close to USD 19 billion in emergency financing and approximately USD 6 billion in 
additional regular financing to African governments.
Significant multilateral support has come from the World Bank, which announced 
in April that up to USD 55 billion would be spent countering Covid-19 in Africa over 
the course of 15 months. Two-thirds of the World Bank projects will  address the 
health sector, although some also include social protection components. Private 
sector support has mainly been channelled through the International Finance Cor-
poration (IFC), which is providing loans to banks and large companies as part of 
its fast track programme. Just over USD 2 billion have been committed so far, and 
USD 422 million have gone to Africa, spread over seven African banks and two non-
financial companies. The African Development Bank (AfDB) has created a Covid-19 
response facility worth USD 10 billion. By mid-September, loans and grants worth 
USD 2.3 billion had been approved. 
Comparable figures on bilateral aid responses to the pandemic are hard to 
come by, but most donor governments have issued announcements on additional 
foreign-aid spending. It is not always possible to conclude whether the funds are 
additional or have been made available by restructuring existing foreign-aid budg-
ets, and the amounts announced often include contributions to multilateral institu-
tions. The European Union has announced that EUR 3.25 billion from its  Covid-19 
response package will go to Africa. The United States, as of late August, had an-
nounced Covid-19 response projects targeting African countries, with a strong 
health focus, worth more than USD 500 million. In the United Kingdom, the twin 
announcements of a merger of the Department for International Development with 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and a drastic GBP 2.9 billion reduction in 
the aid budget have increased uncertainty over the Covid-19 response. The German 
 Federal Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation has announced a EUR 
4 billion package to respond to the pandemic, which includes EUR 3 billion in new 
funding. A regional breakdown is not provided, but Africa is a strong focus. EUR 
520 million will be dedicated to social protection and securing jobs in global supply 
chains, including through the Africa-focused Special Initiative on Training and Job 
Creation. 
It is fair to say that donors have responded to the crisis in a timely and sig-
nificant manner, though open questions remain, including whether the expansion 
of debt relief will extend beyond the poorest countries (see Okonjo-Iweala et al. 
2020). The above figures on actual disbursements vis-à-vis commitments suggest 
that another key challenge from April onwards has been implementation – rather 
2 Based on IMF (2020a), 
as of 14 September 2020, 
and an exchange rate of 
1.41443 XDR/USD.
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than simply a lack of resources. Even in normal times, African governments – es-
pecially those dependent on aid – tend to work at the limits of their absorptive 
 capacity. Although it is too early to judge the effectiveness and efficiency of the sup-
port measures taken, it is apparent that African governments were ill-prepared for 
the crisis. They had to resort to measures that were easily implemented but typically 
meant forgoing tax revenue or other fees. Well-targeted instruments for the poor, 
in particular social protection schemes, or for particularly affected groups – for ex-
ample, firms in certain sectors – were hardly available. This is also apparent in the 
economic impacts seen to date.
Domestic Growth and Welfare Impacts: Huge Country  Differences 
and Informal Sector Vulnerability
In early October, the World Bank estimated that a decline in global GDP per capita 
growth of 5 per cent – the baseline scenario for 2020 – would increase the number 
of Africans living below the international poverty line of USD 1.90 (2011 PPP) by 
26 million. This would mean that the overall poverty rate in Africa would remain 
well above 40 per cent. In the case of prolonged lockdowns, possibly combined 
with a larger global economic downturn, these figures could be much larger. For 
instance, an 8 per cent decline in global GDP per capita growth could push an ad-
ditional 40 million people in sub-Saharan Africa into poverty.
Our reading of aggregate economic indicators for April to July and the  economic 
news from various African countries suggests that economic recovery may happen 
more quickly than some observers have anticipated for some countries, while  others 
face more severe and possibly more contracted crises. South Africa saw a particu-
larly sharp contraction of 51 per cent of GDP from the first to the second  quarter, 
which also implies a contraction of roughly 50 per cent on a year-to-year basis 
(Stats SA, 2020; World Economic Forum 2020). Other countries that have reported 
figures for the second quarter of 2020 have also reported contractions but have 
fared relatively better overall. Nigeria and Ghana have reported output declines of 
approximately 6 per cent (year-on-year) in the second quarter of 2020, but  Ghana’s 
figures for July suggest a quick recovery with a year-on-year positive growth of 
3.8 per cent for June (Bank of Ghana 2020). Similarly, Uganda has reported posi-
tive year-on-year growth for June with 0.21 per cent compared to a year-on-year 
contraction by 7.2 per cent in May (Ugandan Ministry of Finance Planning and 
Economic Development 2020). Recent economic indicators from Kenya, including 
data on mobile payments and on international trade (Kenya National  Bureau of 
Statistics 2020; Omondi 2020), also appear to show some signs of economic re-
covery. This admittedly patchy picture suggests that some countries’ growth may 
exceed expectations, while other countries, in particular South Africa, may con-
siderably underperform even relative to the worst-case scenarios. South Africa’s 
sharp economic decline is a consequence not only of strict lockdown policies and 
a high incidence of Covid-19 infections, but also of initial vulnerability and weak 
previous economic performance, with record unemployment of 30 per cent even 
before the pandemic hit. South Africa’s weakness may spill over to neighbours such 
as Botswana and Namibia. Further, oil-dependent economies are suffering from a 
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dual shock of lockdown policies and much lower oil prices, which may also lead to 
sharper contractions and prolonged recession. 
Differences in the impacts of the crisis can be seen not only between but also 
within countries, and the cited aggregate economic performance indicators con-
ceal much of this impact heterogeneity. Household welfare and poverty impacts 
depend very much on the effects of the shock on wages and employment, which 
in turn depend on which sectors are most heavily hit. As everywhere in the world, 
 tourism, restaurants and bars, and personal services are more affected than agri-
culture and telecommunication services. Evidence from several African countries 
shows that the economic activities of the informal sector have been very severely af-
fected by the lockdown measures, with a GIGA study of 340 informal entrepreneurs 
in Kampala finding that many were closed down temporarily and experienced sharp 
decreases in profits, often to zero (Hartwig and Lakemann 2020). In Nigeria, the 
share of household survey respondents who were working dropped from pre-crisis 
levels of approximately 85 per cent to 43 per cent in April. This share had almost 
fully recovered in rural areas by July 2020 while remaining 11 percentage points 
lower in urban areas, suggesting that the urban informal sector had not yet fully re-
covered (Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics and World Bank 2020). In terms of 
safety nets and coping mechanisms, households in Nigeria and Uganda have mainly 
depleted savings and relied on family and friends for assistance. [3] 
These results demonstrate that those employed in the urban informal sector 
remained largely unprotected against the impacts of the crisis. Even when countries 
have social transfer schemes in place, these mainly target the ultra-poor and are 
thus not designed to reach slightly better off, but still vulnerable households in the 
urban informal sector. And specific measures targeting informal firms may typically 
not have been sufficient to protect against the massive income losses (Schwettmann 
2020). The key question, which is difficult to answer at the moment, is how fast 
informal firms will recover to pre-crisis income levels and whether the potential 
depletion of firm and personal assets will have caused longer-term harm.
While quite a great deal of evidence is available on the severe short-term im-
pacts of the lockdowns on informal workers, much less is known about and little 
data is available on the impacts on formal jobs. An exception is the Business Tracker 
Survey [4] of approximately 4,000 Ghanaian firms interviewed in May/June this 
year (World Bank 2020a). While almost half the firms cut wages, only 4 per cent 
laid off workers. News reports of relatively large employment losses that are very 
likely to include formal jobs come from Kenya (Ecofin Agency 2020; Omondi 2020), 
though the figures have to be interpreted with great care. [5] 
Sharp Declines in Trade, But Not in All Products
According to United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), African 
exports in 2020 declined by 5 per cent in February, 16 per cent in March and 32 per 
cent in April (compared to the same month of the previous year) (UNECA (2020b). 
Africa’s imports experienced a similar decline in the same months of 1 per cent, 
7 per cent, and 25 per cent, respectively. The slump in African trade was thus even 
larger than the decline in the volume of global merchandise trade, which is esti-
mated to have declined by 3 per cent in the first quarter of 2020 and 18.5 per cent 
3 Similar evidence on the 
effects of the lockdowns 
on the informal sector 
is available for Uganda 
( Lakuma Nathan 2020), 
Burkina Faso, Mali, and 
Senegal (Balde et al. 
2020).
4 Implemented by the 
Ghana Statistical Service 
(GSS), in collaboration 
with the United Nations 
Development Programme 
(UNDP) and the World 
Bank.
5 The Kenyan Standard 
has reported that “official 
data” show that more than 
1.7 million Kenyans lost 
their – probably formal – 
jobs within the three 
months after the country 
recorded its first case 
of Covid-19. According 
to ecofinagency.com, 
Kenya’s tourism minister 
has reported an even higher 
number of 2.5 million jobs 
lost in tourism alone in the 
past five months. This is an 
industry with an important 
share of formal employment.
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in the second. The World Bank forecasts a decline in exports and imports of 11 per 
cent and 7 per cent, respectively, for the sub-Saharan region (World Bank 2020c). 
Factors underlying the drastic decline in trade include the slowdown in global 
demand; declining commodity prices, especially for crude oil; supply chain disrup-
tions; and export restrictions. Aggregate figures on African trade, however, conceal 
the heterogeneous sectoral impacts across the continent. Negative impacts were 
especially harsh for oil exporters such as Angola and Nigeria, where the value of 
exports declined by approximately 30 per cent and 50 per cent, respectively, in the 
months of March and April 2020 (UNECA 2020a). Similarly, exporters of minerals 
such as Botswana and Namibia experienced substantial declines in export volumes 
due to lower global demand. 
African exports of agricultural products have proven to be more resilient, in-
creasing by more than 6 per cent in the first quarter of 2020, remaining stable in 
March 2020 and decreasing by approximately 1 per cent in April 2020 (all relative 
to the same month in 2019, WTO 2020). However, the impacts were heterogeneous 
across exporters of agricultural products. For example, the four cotton-exporting 
countries Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali experienced large slumps in exports 
in April (between 33 per cent and 54 per cent). In contrast, exports of other agricul-
tural products such as staple foods, processed fruits, vegetables, and coffee only de-
creased moderately or even increased slightly in the first quarter of 2020. The April 
drop in exports was much less pronounced for edible agricultural products than for 
other products. For a few countries, including Ethiopia, exports in April 2020 were 
even higher than in the previous year because of increases in selected agricultural 
products. Encouraging evidence of a quicker recovery than expected comes from 
Kenya, mainly due to a rebound in earnings from horticulture. While exports in 
April were 13 per cent lower compared to April 2019, they were 3 per cent above the 
2019 value by July 2020 (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 2020). 
African imports also fell sharply as the global pandemic unfolded, with nota-
ble differences across sectors and countries. While about half of African countries 
recorded import growth in the first quarter of 2020 compared to 2019, all but two 
saw their imports decrease in April, driven by the trade restrictions and a lower 
fuel import bill (AFREC 2020). Notwithstanding this overall decrease and despite 
falling prices, imports of agricultural products increased by more than 10 per cent 
in April in numerous African countries (WTO 2020). And although threats to food 
security – partly related to Covid-19 – are an issue in (parts of) certain countries 
(World Bank 2020b), food trade has remained resilient and has secured the food 
supply in Africa’s import-dependent food markets (at the aggregate level, approxi-
mately 85 per cent of Africa’s food comes from outside the continent).
In sum, the particularities of Africa’s integration into the world economy have 
had diverse impacts on the continent’s trade performance. While the “traditional” 
oil price slump, which has also accompanied previous economic crises, affects the 
usual suspects in expected ways, we see effects on agricultural and food exports as 
well as on imports that are specific to this crisis. 
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Drastic Short-Term Declines in FDI
Trade and domestic economic performance matter for FDI decisions, which will in 
turn shape the future integration of Africa into the world economy. The economic 
downturn and the uncertainty induced by the pandemic may mean that foreign 
firms disinvest and/or that planned and new investment projects are postponed or 
cancelled. Estimates by UNCTAD (2020b) suggest that multinational enterprises 
in Africa are revising their earnings downwards by approximately 11 per cent. Re-
cent surveys of European firms active abroad shed some light on their potential 
responses to the crisis. Of a small sample of French and German firms active in 
Ghana, 66 per cent indicated in April that they were planning to postpone or cancel 
investment as a response to the crisis (AHK Ghana and CCI France Ghana 2020), 
and almost half of German firms active in Kenya said the same (DIHK and AHK 
2020). The majority of European firms surveyed in Ghana said they needed to lay 
off staff or were attempting to cut costs in an effort to prevent layoffs (AHK Ghana 
and CCI France Ghana 2020).
Recent data show a strong reduction in announced greenfield FDI projects in Af-
rica in the first half of 2020. Figure 3 depicts the quarterly number of announced 
projects, investment volumes, and jobs created for all African regions from the fdi 
Markets database. The negative effects on greenfield FDI markets were pronounced 
in the first quarter of 2020 and amplified in the second quarter of 2020. Recent 
data from the months of July and August 2020 suggests that a quick recovery to 
pre-crisis  levels is unlikely, although the year-on-year decline is less drastic than 
for the  second quarter.
The actual and expected impact of Covid-19 on greenfield FDI in Africa varies 
between sectors, although no activities are exempt from the strong decline. Green-
field FDI in the service sector, which attracted almost 60 per cent of newly an-
nounced greenfield investment volume in 2019, has not been spared negative im-
pacts. Investments in key sectors such as construction, electricity, or transport have 
declined strongly, by more than 50 per cent of investment volume. The aviation 
industry and the tourism sector have been gravely affected, with an estimated de-
cline in worldwide tourist arrivals of between 58 and 78 per cent (CCSA 2020) and 
Figure 3 
Greenfield FDI  
Projects Announced 
in 2020 
Source: Authors’ 
own compilation. Data 
source: fdi Markets.
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a decline of approximately 93 per cent in investment amounts in greenfield projects 
in tourism. As much of Africa’s tourism relies on long-distance travel and tourists 
from severely affected world areas, its recovery may be slower than in other parts of 
the world. Other sectors could benefit from the Covid-19 crisis. The pre-crisis posi-
tive trend in information and communication technologies (ICT) and FinTech is 
being accelerated by social distancing requirements. Several African governments 
have taken steps to move more economic transactions into the digital space. Some 
have cooperated with mobile money operators during the crisis to lower or abolish 
the fees on small-scale transfers in order to encourage the use of mobile money over 
cash. Although some of these measures are temporary and, in the case of mobile 
money transfers, cut into operators’ revenues, they accelerate the digital transfor-
mation and make investments in the sector more attractive. 
In 2019, 40 per cent of all greenfield project announcements were linked to 
natural resources (UNCTAD 2020). [6] The commodity price shocks make such in-
vestments less viable and the outlook is most negative for oil exporters, such as 
Angola or Nigeria, and also for exporters of copper and iron ore (gold is an excep-
tion). Recent greenfield data show that mining and quarrying activities have indeed 
experienced a vast decline of approximately 90 per cent in investment amounts in 
an average quarter of 2020 compared to the 2019 quarterly average. Similarly, FDI 
in manufacturing has already taken a significant hit of approximately 76 per cent in 
investment volumes in an average quarter of 2020 compared to 2019. The severity 
of the impact varies between manufacturing sectors but can be expected to be most 
palpable in those linked to resource extraction and in specific global value chains 
(GVCs) – for example, the automotive sector. Finally, agriculture, while still the 
backbone of many African economies, only attracts a tiny portion of the continent’s 
FDI. Impacts on greenfield FDI in the sector are moderate, as it is less affected by 
social distancing (Sandefur and Subramanian 2020), and prices for key agricultural 
commodities such as sugar, cocoa, tea, and coffee are relatively stable or even rising 
(IMF 2020b).
Policy Implications
The coronavirus pandemic and the associated lockdowns and distancing measures 
have had severe economic consequences in Africa. However, the impacts differ con-
siderably between countries, the informal and formal sectors, industries, and traded 
products. The economic and social policy responses should take this heterogeneity 
of impacts into account. With the notable exception of South Africa, the pandemic 
appears to be following a somewhat milder trajectory than elsewhere, though this 
assessment is based on data that are weaker than for other world regions. Strict 
lockdown policies may have contributed to containing the disease early on, but they 
have caused great economic damage. Economic support measures, however, have 
been far more moderate than elsewhere, though the international community has 
provided additional assistance to African economies.
The most recent economic data suggests that economic activity declined dra-
matically during the lockdowns. The very sharp decline in South Africa is particu-
larly worrying, as it is likely to affect neighbouring economies as well. At the same 
time, some countries in West and East Africa are already showing signs of recovery 
6 The figure of 40 per 
cent includes resource 
extraction itself as well as 
related industries outside 
the primary sector.
   10    GIGA FOCUS | AFRICA | NO. 6 | OCTOBER 2020
that may take place more quickly than anticipated. Looking solely at African ag-
gregate growth performance and aggregate poverty will be misleading. Short-term 
impacts, especially on urban poverty, have likely been severe: The evidence is clear 
that informal workers across the continent have suffered drastic income losses dur-
ing the lockdowns, as few have been shielded by social protection or other policies. 
It remains to be seen how quickly they can recover from the shock, but there is some 
empirical silver lining here as well.
As elsewhere in the world, industries have been affected heterogeneously by the 
pandemic and the associated restrictions. This also holds for the external  sector. 
Trade has declined dramatically, but our analysis reveals important differences be-
tween export products. Oil exporters have been adversely affected by the oil price 
slump and impacts on products traded in GVCs have been diverse, ranging from 
strong declines in textiles and apparel to increases in some food products. Food im-
ports have hardly been affected, as global food supply chains have, overall, proven 
relatively resilient thus far. Finally, FDI is likely to drop substantially in 2020. Al-
though there is again sectoral variation, this drop will not spare investments con-
sidered key for an acceleration of Africa’s economic development and the creation 
of productive employment.
The drop in FDI demonstrates the uncertainty that looms over the hope for 
quick recovery. Huge setbacks to economic progress and poverty reduction in 
 Africa can only be avoided with a quick recovery. A prolonged economic recession 
would not only cause poverty to rise further, but the medium- to long-term costs of 
the shock could be exacerbated by political turmoil or even increased conflict. So 
what can be learnt from our analysis of the past few months? First, our assessment 
clearly calls for a targeted and differentiated response to the economic impacts of 
the pandemic across countries, industries, and affected workers and households. 
For example, informal urban workers who continue to be affected by restrictions 
require assistance. At the international level, a concerted effort to support par-
ticularly affected economies – for example, South Africa – should be considered. 
Second, it is now well understood that the pandemic involves difficult choices. It 
seems that African governments, at least initially, chose a path that put “years of 
life lost” over “additional poverty years.” [7] The “new normal,” based on enhanced 
knowledge about the disease and transmission, should probably put more weight on 
the economic costs of pandemic-related restrictions. Third, quick recovery should 
be a priority. While calls to see the crisis as an opportunity for change are jus-
tified, there may be trade-offs between “building back better” and “building back 
quicker” if the former involves long-term planning and delays in the disbursement 
of funds and implementation. Fourth, this is not to say that absolutely anything 
is useful simply because it is quick. In particular, it is important to avoid the pos-
sibility that increased health spending by government and donors fails to address 
long-term challenges and the sustainability of public service delivery. Fifth, and 
finally, African governments need to increase their economies’ and citizens’ resil-
ience to ( economic) shocks. Putting into place social protection systems that can be 
used in times of crisis is one important element. Further, the establishment of more 
targeted – ideally automatic – stabilisers should be considered – for example, a 
context-adjusted version of Germany’s furlough (Kurzarbeit) scheme.
7 Decerf et al. (2020) 
contrast mortality and 
poverty estimates around 
the globe. Their results 
suggest that the poverty 
consequences of the pan-
demic (measured as years 
spent in poverty) largely 
outweigh the health or 
mortality costs (years of life 
lost), particularly in poorer 
countries.
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